Introduction
In a financial market, the minimum tick size is the minimum allowable price variation.
Minimum tick rules can apply to quotes, to trades and to trade reports. On the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the minimum tick for quotes, for trades and for trade reports is $1/8 until June 24, 1997, when the tick size was reduced to $1/16 (teenies). On the London Stock Exchange (LSE), there is no minimum tick size for quotes, trades or trade reports. On the Nasdaq Stock Market, there was a minimum tick size of $1/8 for quotes until June 2, 1997. However trades could take place at any price increment. Trade reports were rounded to the next 1/8 th . In the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's S&P 500 futures contract, the tick size is 0.10 index points or $25 per contract. Formal tick size rules do not exist in the London Stock Market or in OTC bond markets and currency markets.
The literature on market microstructure is replete with studies of attributes that affect or reflect market liquidity such as tick size, bid-ask spreads, quote clustering, and market depth.
While we begin with tick size, the objective of this paper is to tie these various characteristics of markets into a more general view that reflects the underlying market structure. We examine the source and the impact of a minimum tick rule by considering stocks traded in different market structures. Specifically, we examine a set of stocks traded in London, where there is no mandated tick size, and also traded on the NYSE, where there is a mandated tick size. We conclude that market structure is the exogenous factor responsible for the presence of tick size rules and other market microstructure attributes.
Related to the question of tick size is the empirical phenomenon of clustering. Clustering on eve n 1/8 th s was used as evidence by Christie and Schultz (1994) of implicit collusion on Nasdaq. We propose a measure of clustering that is akin to the Herfindahl Index, and we analyze clustering of quotes and of trade prices and the relation of clustering to spreads, tick size and market structure. In particular, we examine the hypotheses that price clustering is due to (1) ease of negotiation, (2) implicit collusion, and (3) market structure. We conclude that market structure is responsible for the observed clustering. We also find evidence that suggests higher spreads in the LSE are partially offset by higher mandated depth behind the quotes. We trace the differential depth requirements to the differential market structures.
Our general approach differs from many recent studies that focus on the effect of particular market features. For example, a flurry of recent studies, some prompted by the planned decimalization of the U.S. market, examines the pre and post-effects of a reduction in tick size.
1
On July 18, 1994, the Stock Exchange of Singapore reduced the minimum tick size for stocks trading at or above $25 from $0.50 to $0.10. Lau and McInish (1995) examine the effects of the reduction on both bid-ask spreads and market depth. The American Stock Exchange (AMEX)
has reduced its tick size in stages. Crack (1995) and Ahn, Cao, and Choe (1996) examine the 1992 switch from 1/8 th to 1/16 th for stocks below $5. Ronen and Weaver (1998) examine the extension of the rule to all stocks on the AMEX on May 7, 1997. The Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) moved from a fractional to a decimal trading system on April 15, 1996. Bacidore (1997) , Porter and Weaver (1997) , and Ahn, Cao, and Choe (1998) study the impact of the TSE's switch on bid-ask spreads. The NYSE adopted the teenies on June 24, 1997. Bollen and Whaley (1998) and Goldstein and Kavajecz (1998) examine this change. The Nasdaq Stock Market changed the minimum quote increment from 1/8 th to 1/16 th for bid prices greater than $10 on June 2, 1997.
2 Smith (1998) examines t he change that occurred in the midst of a series of changes to implement the Order Handling Rules (OHR). 3 All these studies conclude that the adoption of a smaller tick size lowers spreads. The evidence on the market depth is less uniform but, by and large, suggests that it may be adversely affected.
The most important difference in our study is its focus on the role of market structure in determining bid-ask spreads and tick size rules. In contrast, the earlier studies often hold market structure constant by examining a change in tick rule on the same exchange. 4 We examine whether both tick size rules and spreads are endogenous in a broader model of exchange structures. In addition we consider the extent to which other features of markets -the degree of quote and price clustering and the depth of market are associated with market structure. Previous studies, more narrowly focused on changes in existing tick size rules, may be affected by changes in market-wide and firm-specific information before and after the adoption of a new tick 1 See SEC (1994) Market 2000 report. 2 For bid prices below $10, the tick size is 1/32 nd . 3 See Barclay et. al. (1997) for an analysis of the impact of OHR on the first 100 stocks to be phased into compliance with the rule. 4 An exception is the study by Ahn, Cao, and Choe (1998) who examine TSE stocks that are cross-listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq. size. Our study is robust with respect to these changes since we examine a given set of stocks traded at the same time in different markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the analytical framework. Section 3 describes our data set, which consists of U.K. stocks that are also traded on the NYSE as American Depository Receipts (ADRs). The next four sections present the empirical evidence on spreads (Section 4), clustering (Section 5), clustering and spreads (Section 6), and depth, tick size and spreads (Section 7). Section 8 contains the conclusion.
Analytic Framework
The premise underlying our analytical framework is that the distinction between auction and dealer markets is important. The key feature differentiating the two market structures is the treatment of public limit orders. In an auction market, limit orders are displayed and may trade against incoming market orders. In a dealer market, limit orders are held by each dealer, are not displayed, and can only be traded against the dealer's quote. The distinction has implications for the level of spreads, for the existence of a tick rule, for the degree of clustering, for the quoted depth and perhaps for other characteristics of markets.
Spreads
It is well established that the dollar spread varies cross-sectionally according to stock characteristics such the stock price, volume of trading, volatility, amount of informational trading, and the like. Under the null hypothesis that market structure has no effect on spreads, the relation between spread and stock characteristics would be the same in dealer and auction markets. But there is evidence for the alternative hypothesis that dealer market spreads are higher than auction market spreads even for the same stocks simply because of the effect of different market structures. 5 The principle reason for lower spreads in auction markets is that limit orders narrow spreads in comparison to dealer spreads. In a dealer market, dealers determine the spread.
In an auction market, limit orders determine the spread.
Tick rules
The existence and importance of tick rules is also a function of market structure. A dealer market, like that in London, does not mandate time priority (across dealers). A tick rule, as Harris (1991) has pointed out, is essential if time priority is to have meaning. Time priority has 5 See for example Huang and Stoll (1996) .
little meaning if the person who is first to quote the best bid can lose that position to someone who quotes only a penny more. Conversely, if there is not time priority, a tick rule is not necessary. Consequently, it is not surprising that dealer markets, where there is not time priority, have evolved with little attention to a tick rule. Even on Nasdaq, the 1/8 tick was a convention for quoting bids and asks, not a rule, and the convention did not apply to transactions.
Transactions could be negotiated at price increments of $1/256 or in decimal format with up to eight digits to the right of the decimal. In an auction market, where limit orders have standing, a tick rule is needed to make time priority meaningful. Without a tick rule, customers could easily step ahead of dealers or conversely dealers and floor brokers could easily step ahead of customers. 6 In summary, a tick rule is endogenous. It arises in auction markets to facilitate orderly trading and give time priority meaning.
A tick rule, while the outcome of an auction market, can have an independent effect on spreads, as demonstrated by Harris (1994) . Tick size increases spreads for stocks with spreads that would otherwise be less than the tick size. For example, suppose an $8 stock would normally have an 8-cent spread. If the minimum tick is 12.5 cents, the spread can be no less than 12.5
cents. The tick size raises spreads in an auction market, particularly for low price stocks. Yet it remains possible that spreads in dealer market exceed those in an auction market.
Clustering
Another feature of markets that may be affected by market structure is the degree to which prices cluster. Clustering is the tendency for prices to fall on a subset of available prices.
Clustering is defined with respect to a price grid. For example if prices are quoted in eighths, clustering exists if all eight price positions are not used equally. Clustering can be measured by the fraction of prices at even eighths as in Christie and Schultz (1994) . We define a measure of clustering for stock i, C i , that is similar to the Herfindahl Index:
where F ik is the observed frequency of price k and * ik F is the theoretical frequency under the assumption of a uniform distribution. For example if the available prices are eighths, the theoretical frequency with which a price falls on each eighth is 1/8. If the actual frequency is also 6 The NYSE does not follow a strict time priority rule. To minimize the breaking up of large orders, the time priority rule applies only to the first limit order. The remaining limit orders follow a size priority rule; namely limit orders that match we expect clustering within a market to increase with stock price and with the spread. The higher the stock price and/or the greater the spread, the less the importance of a small price increment and the larger the price increment traders are likely to choose. For example, in negotiating for a house, the price increment will not be $0.25.
Second, clustering is a function of market structure because it is related to the number of traders with standing. In a dealer market, only recognized dealers have standing and display quotes. Dealers are often required to trade in size, and they must cover a variety of costs. These obligations and costs can lead to wider quoted spreads and greater clustering. In an auction market, limit orders have standing. Public investors do not incur some of the costs of a dealer, and they have an incentive to place limit orders that beat dealer quotes. The presence of many limit orders tends to narrow spreads and reduce clustering because more prices are likely to be used. In a dealer market, clustering will be most evident in quotes and will tend to be negotiated away in trades. In an auction market, limit orders allow the public to pre-negotiate prices inside dealer quotes by placing limit orders. Consequently we expect less quote clustering in an auction market (where every price is more likely to be used) than in a dealer market (where fewer participants reduce the chance that every price is used).
Third, Christie and Schultz (1994) and Dutta and Madhavan ( 1997) argue that clustering of prices on even eighths reflects coordination by dealers in Nasdaq to raise spreads above competitive levels. Christie and Schultz find nearly total avoidance of odd eighths for some but not all Nasdaq stocks, and they conclude that coordination among dealers raises spreads. Both the market structure and implicit collusion imply greater clustering in dealer than in auction the size of the market order at the best price are given priority over other limit orders that might have been placed earlier market. We distinguish the two by examining the nature and degree of clustering in quotes in comparison to trade prices. The coordination view implies substantial clustering in both quotes and trade prices. If dealers are to profit from wide spreads associated with quote clustering, they must trade at the quoted prices; hence, trade prices must also cluster.
In summary, we investigate three hypotheses in regard to clustering. 
Depth
Define depth to be the quantity bid or offered at the inside quote. Depth will be related to other features of market such as spreads, tick size and degree of clustering. In particular, we expect depth to be less in an auction market because limit orders narrow the spread and decrease the tick size. Depth is reduced because spread narrowing limit orders are small. They are small because large limit orders do not want to take the risk of being "picked off" by informed traders, and because many limit orders may be placed by individual investors seeking to better the quote.
Depth will tend to be larger in pure dealer markets because dealers implicitly operate at larger tick size and larger spreads.
Data
We begin with a sample of 31 FTSE 100 firms that are traded in the U.S. in 1995. Five firms are deleted from the list for trading less than 200 times during January or December of but are not first in time at the best price. 7 Of course we cannot rule out that there are some traders or times in which dealers are able to extract monopoly rents.
1995. One additional firm was lost for switching exchanges and another one for merging during the year. Of the remaining 27, there are 19 listed on the NYSE, 4 on the AMEX, and 1 on Nasdaq. Our final sample is the set of 19 British stocks traded as ADRs on the NYSE.
8
By examining the same stocks under different market structures, we hold constant stock characteristics and are able to investigate the role of market structure. NYSE quote and transaction data are from TAQ. We restrict the data set to quote and trade prices on t he NYSE and exclude quotes and prices from the regional exchanges and Nasdaq. The Transaction Data
Service of the LSE supplied the U.K. transactions data. The data is error-checked with the typical filters. 9 Days when either the NYSE or LSE is closed are excluded.
The sample list and some descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1 London by 10, the biggest ADR ratio.
Spreads in London and New York
If differences in spread were a matter of tick size alone, one would expect smaller spreads in London, where there is no minimum tick, than in New York, where there is a minimum tick.
We measure the percentage quoted spreads as 8 It would also be of interest to examine U.S. firms that are traded on the LSE. We exclude this sample for structural and data reasons. The system for U.S. stocks on the LSE is the SEAQ-International (SEAQ-I). However, unlike SEAQ, SEAQ-I is more a brokerage system than a dealership market and quotes posted on the SEAQ-I are not firm and are primarily for advertising. There are data reasons for not looking at this sample as well. Of the 100 most actively traded foreign stocks in London, only four are U.S. firms in 1995. The available data on SEAQ-I for U.S. are also of poor quality. Table 1 shows that these three exceptions have sizable daily U.K. share volume but have the three lowest daily U.S. share volume. Therefore, the higher quoted spreads in U.S. are due to the lack of liquidity on the New York market. Table   2B shows that when the comparison is restricted to the period in which both markets are open during the first two hours of trading on the NYSE, spreads remain significantly lower in New York than in London with the exception of the same three stocks.
10 London spreads are the same in the total and the overlap periods, but New York spreads are higher in the overlap period, something that reflects the well-known tendency for spreads to be higher at the open than during the rest of the day.
One cannot ascribe the lower New York quoted spreads to differences in stock characteristics -these are the same stocks. The underlying risk of each stock is a given.
Furthermore, volume in London exceeds volume in New York after adjusting for the ADR ratio, which would imply higher spreads in New York, not in London.
Quoted Spreads could be higher in dealer markets than in auction markets because of structural factors, such as the treatment of limit orders and commissions, or because of implicit collusion (Christie and Schultz (1994) and Huang and Stoll (1996) ), but the difference cannot be ascribed to a tick rule. Evidence on effective spreads can help distinguish these possibilities. The effective spread is defined as
where p is the transaction price. In Table 4 we compare LSE and NYSE effective spreads by trade size category. Trade sizes in London are grouped by normal market size (NMS). NMS is the amount London dealers must be willing to trade at their quotes. This number is publicly available. Share volumes are grouped into those less than half the NMS, those greater than half NMS and less than 1 NMS, and those greater than 1 NMS. Corresponding trade size categories are constructed for New York by using the ADR ratio to adjust the NMS. The table shows that effective spreads in London exceed effective spreads in New York in all size categories. In a dealer market one might expect little decline in the effective spread for small orders, which are not able to negotiate. However, the effective spread for small orders in London is about the same as the effective spread for medium orders, where negotiation might be more common.
We hasten to add that we do not want to put too much reliance on the effective spread results because the calculation of effective spreads is subject to error. To calculate an effective spread a trade price must be compared to the quote existing when the trade took place. Because trades and quotes are reported by different systems and with potentially different delays, the trades and quotes that correspond can be difficult to identify. Our procedure was to associate 11 The careful reader will note that the number of observations in Table 3 is different from the number in Table 2 . This is because the item being observed in Table 3 is the trade. Given a trade the preceding quote is associated with it. It is possible that a given quote is followed by more than one trade, or that quotes change without trades. In a volatile market a delayed trade price, dating back 5 minutes, for example, might very well be outside the current bid-ask spread because the current spread reflects the current information, not the information of 5 minutes ago. If this reasoning also applies to our data, effective spreads would be biased upward. This does not appear to be the case, for London effective spreads (where the reporting delays are feared to be large) decline more in relation to quoted spreads than they do in New York (where reporting delays are assumed to be less).
Clustering in London and New York
A difficulty in measuring clustering for the U.K. is that in the absence of a minimum tick size, the set of available prices is not readily defined. We assume that the available prices can fall on pennies, which is a fine price grid. However, relative to the average stock price in London, it is only slightly finer than in New York. In London the price increment of one penny is 0.17% of the average stock price of £6, and in New York, the price increment of $1/8 is 0.27% of the average stock price of $46. Thus the price grids are of approximately the same magnitude relative to stock prices in each market. The somewhat finer London price grid biases our cluster measure in the direction of higher clustering in LSE relative to NYSE because the likelihood that all prices are used is reduced when there are more price positions.
We first measure clustering of quotes and trade prices in London and New York by calculating the distribution of trades by tick category and reporting our cluster index. These data are provided for each stock in Tables 5 and 6 .
Consider first clustering in quoted prices. Data for each stock for London and New York are in Tables 5A and 6A respectively. Only the cluster indices for bid quotes are shown but the conclusions are the same for ask quotes. First, clustering of quotes in London is less than we anticipated. There is evidence of some clustering at the "0" and "5" digits, but the average fraction of quotes at these digits is 13.8% and 13.5% of the quotes as compared with 10% under a uniform distribution. The average cluster measure for the LSE is 0.01331. Recall that the measure would be 0.10 if half the available digits were used. The clustering in London does not appear to be of the same magnitude as that found in Nasdaq by Christie and Schultz (1994) .
Second, quote clustering is higher in London than in New York. The quote cluster index averages .0133 in London and .0067 in New York. We expect the cluster index to be somewhat higher in London because the price grid is relatively finer in London than in New York and because ten possible price digits (0 to 9) rather than just eight (0 to 7) in New York. Even taking account of these factors, clustering appears higher in London than New York. We suspect that We conclude that an auction market structure tends to result in less quote clustering than does a dealer market structure but that differences in market structure do not result in differences in trade clustering. In a dealer market like London, quotes may cluster, but trade prices are often negotiated inside the quotes, reducing the clustering of trade prices relative to quotes. In an auction market like New York, quotes don't cluster because the placement of limit orders inside dealer quotes reduces clustering. In an auction market, limit orders effectively pre-negotiate the terms at which they trade as part of the trading system, by placing limit orders. In a dealer market, incoming orders negotiate better prices outside the market structure via telephone or other means. In an auction market, limit orders cause the clustering in transaction prices to be like the clustering in quotes, whereas in a dealer market, the clustering in transaction prices is less than the clustering in quotes.
Clustering and Spreads
How are clustering and spreads related? In our analytical framework we propose that, within a market, quote clustering and spreads are related to firm characteristics in the same way.
In other words, the larger a stock's bid-ask spread the larger its clustering index. Table 7 shows that quote clustering and spreads are indeed very highly correlated within each market. In the NYSE, the correlation between quote clustering and bid-ask spread is 0.97, and in London, this correlation is 0.93. Although quoted spreads and clustering are highly correlated in both markets, the level of spreads and of clustering is greater in the London dealer market, as shown in the preceding sections.
The correlations of trade clustering and spreads are different in the two markets. Trade clustering is highly correlated with spreads in New York, with a correlation of 0.940, but, in London, the correlation of trade clustering and spreads is 0.588, which is much less than that for quotes. This difference reflects the role of limit orders. On the NYSE, quotes change as limit orders are traded, with the result that quote changes and price changes are more closely aligned.
Consequently clustering of quotes and trade prices are highly correlated on the NYSE. In dealer markets, quotes are not directly influenced by limit orders and change less frequently, while transactions may take place at several price locations at or inside the spread. Consequently quote clustering and trade price clustering are not as highly correlated. In the London dealer market there is more room for negotiation of the final price relative to the quote than in the NYSE auction market.
Depth, Tick Size and Spreads
Given a choice, why would investors trade on a dealer market like London rather than an auction market? Many investors, of course do not have the choice, but others, such as large institutions, do. An offsetting benefit to a higher spread is the ability to carry out larger trades.
Tick rules are usually related to depth rules. On the NYSE, there is no minimum depth for quotes. For example, a limit order can be entered for as little as 1 00 shares. In an auction market, limit orders not only narrow the spread, as we noted earlier, but also tend to lower the quoted depth. On the other hand, in an institutionally oriented dealer market such as London, dealers tend to offer substantial depth. London requires dealers to trade a normal market size (NMS) that is substantial. Table 8 shows that for all stocks in our sample, the minimum depth established by the NMS averages 16,513 ADR shares in comparison to an average quoted depth of about 12,000
shares in New York. 13 The NMS is substantially larger than the average quoted depth in New
York for all stocks except GLX, HAN, ICI, and VOD. These results for quoted depth are consistent with the other differences between the NYSE auction market and London dealer market: Limit orders narrow spread, require tick rules, lower depth, and lessen clustering.
Trade sizes, tabulated in Table 9 relative to the NMS, reflect the greater depth in London.
Similar to Table 4 , trade sizes are grouped into those less than half the NMS, those greater than half NMS and less than one NMS, and those greater than one NMS. A larger fraction of London trades exceed the NMS -6% --than is the case in New York-2%. These trades are likely to be adjust quotes an investor can execute several trades with different dealers at the current quote. 13 In our sample, the quoted depth exceeds the NMS 9% of the time.
Each dealer knowing of this possibility must set spreads to reflect the anticipated difficulty of reversing his position in a market where other dealers are trying to reverse their positions.
Consequently spreads are higher in London not only because depths are higher but also because of the additional risk. Because quoted spreads are relatively higher than differences in depth might imply, effective spreads fall by 45% from the quoted spreads in London but by only 20%
in New York as shown earlier in Table 3 . The differences in these declines are not due to differences in trade sizes. Table 9 shows that London trade sizes exceed those on New York albeit not by as much as the difference in depths might imply.
In summary, the higher quoted spreads on the LSE relative to those on the NYSE are associated with higher depth requirements on the LSE. However, spreads and quote sizes are also related to other characteristics of dealer markets such as the absence of time priority rules and tick sizes. These characteristics are a result of the dealer market structure, in particular the role of limit orders on the LSE. Thus, depth, tick size and spreads are all interrelated and reflect the underlying market design. The basic proposition of this paper is that microstructure characteristics are not independent of market structure. Spreads, tick size, clustering, depth and market structure are linked. Our conclusion may be summarized as follows:
Dealer markets tend to have higher spreads than auction markets. London spreads are higher than New York spreads in those same s tocks. This conclusion is similar to that in Huang and Stoll (1996) were we find that Nasdaq spreads exceed NYSE spreads in comparable stocks.
However in the Nasdaq/NYSE comparison the difference in spreads appeared too large to be explained by market structure alone. In the London/NYSE comparison we conclude market structure alone, not implicit collusion of dealers, explains the difference.
A minimum tick is required in an auction market to encourage liquidity provision by limit orders and by dealers. Without a minimum tick (or a minimum trade size), a limit order can cheaply step ahead of another limit order or a dealer quote. If there is no minimum tick, it is easy to avoid time priority. Dealer markets do not require time priority across dealers and they have less need for a minimum tick. However, each dealer quotes in depth even in the absence of a tick rule because he wishes to maintain a reputation for liquidity or because dealer markets set standards as to depth.
Quote clustering is highly correlated with spreads and with the stock characteristics that determine spreads. If a market has higher spreads it has greater clustering. While this result is true for London/NYSE, we show that the degree of clustering in London is less than was found by Christie and Schultz in their analysis of the Nasdaq dealer market.
Trade clustering is less than quote clustering in London and about the same in New York.
We ascribe this difference to differences in market structure -the role of limit orders in particular. In New York, limit orders break up quote clustering as they seek to gain priority. In
London fewer traders have standing -only the dealers. Negotiation for better prices by customers takes place off the screen whereas negotiation in an auction market takes place on the screen via limit order placement. In London negotiation is successful as measured by the decline in trade price clustering relative to quote clustering. In New York, trade prices cluster about the same amount as quotes.
Higher spreads in the London dealer market are accompanied by greater depth. Trade sizes are larger in London consistent with the large depth, but the difference in trade size is not as great as the difference in depths. In the NYSE auction market limit orders tend to prenegotiate by placing orders inside the specialist's quote that tend to narrow the spread and lessen the depth. In the London dealer market, dealers set wider quotes and larger depths but negotiate trades for smaller quantities and smaller spreads.
Viewing the evolution of exchanges as Darwin viewed the evolution of species, we conclude that the various features of markets reflect adaptation to their surroundings. Tick size, spread, clustering, depth, trade size, and effective spread are all endogenous to basic market structure, namely, dealer versus auction market. Table 1  Descriptive Statistics  The table presents The table presents quoted spreads as a percent of mid points for U.K. securities and their corresponding U.S. ADRs based on data for the entire trading day in each country. The sample period is January 1, 1995 to December 31, 1995. Heteroskedastic-consistent tstatistics are reported for test of the null hypothesis of equal U.S. and U.K. spreads. The # of observations is the sum of New York and London observations. The table presents quoted and effective spreads as a percent of mid points for U.K. securities and their corresponding U.S. ADRs based on data for the entire trading day in each country. All quoted spreads are trade-weighted. The sample period is January 1, 1995 to December 31, 1995. Diff is computed as (% quoted spread -% effective spread) ÷ % quoted spread. An asterisk in the last NYSE column indicates that the heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value is less than 5% in test of the null hypothesis that Diff is the same on both exchanges. The # of observations is the sum of New York and London observations. LSE NYSE The table presents the quoted depth during 1995 on the London Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange. Depth on the LSE is represented by the "NMS," the normal market size or the minimum quantity that a market maker is obliged to quote for a firm two -way price on the LSE's Stock Exchange Automated Quotation System. The NMS has been adjusted by the ADR ratio to restate it in ADR units. Depth on the NYSE is the average of bid and ask depths. An asterisk in the NYSE Depth columns indicates that the heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value is less than 5% in test of the null hypothesis that the depth is the same on both exchanges. 
